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Abstract 
 
The Prisoner’s Dilemma game has a long history stretching across the social, biological, and 
physical sciences.  In 2012, Press and Dyson developed a method for analyzing the mapping of 
the 8-dimensional strategy profile onto the 2-dmensional payoff space in an infinitely iterated 
Prisoner’s Dilemma game, based on Markov chain analysis with memory-one strategies.  We 
generalize this approach and introduce the concept of strategy parameter to show that linear 
relations among player payoffs are a ubiquitous feature of the infinitely iterated Prisoner’s 
Dilemma game.  Our extended analysis is applied to various strategy profiles including tit-for-tat, 
win-stay-lose-shift, and other randomized strategy sets.  Strategy profiles are identified that map 
onto the vertices, edges, and interior of the Prisoner’s Dilemma quadrilateral in the two-
dimensional payoff (score) space.  A DaMD strategy is defined based solely on “Defection after 
Mutual Defection” and leads to linear relations between player scores using strategy parameter 
analysis.  The DaMD strategy is shown to result in an equal (reciprocal) or larger (extortive) score 
for its user compared to the other player, independent of the strategy set of the other player. The 
extortive scores occur when the probabilities for the DaMD player to cooperate after conflicting 
plays (cooperate-defect or defect-cooperate) sum to less than 1.  The equal reciprocal scores occur 
when the probabilities for the DaMD player to cooperate after conflicting plays (cooperate-defect 
or defect-cooperate) sum to 1.  When one player selects the extortive DaMD, the opposing player 
can force the equal punishment payoffs for both players in the infinitely iterated Prisoner’s 
Dilemma by also choosing the DaMD strategy. Possible pathways to mutual cooperation based on 
DaMD are discussed. 
  
 
PACS Codes: 02.50.Ga; 02.50.Le; 89.65.-s; 89.75.Fb 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
Prisoner’s Dilemma is a time-honored paradigm for 2X2 games that are used for understanding of 
complex problems in the social, behavioral, biological, and physical sciences [1,2,3,4].  Prisoner’s 
Dilemma (PD) was developed in 1950 at RAND by Flood and Dresher [2].  Axelrod describes 
many of the strategies used to solve the iterated PD and reports on “tournaments” to test various 
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strategies developed by himself and many others [3].  These tournaments have continued in one 
form or another [5].  Nowak has authored an accessible book which treats the iterated PD as well 
as other classic iterated games focusing on evolutionary dynamics [6].  Recently, Lambert, 
Vyawahare, and Austin have applied a game theory approach to the physics of bacteria growth 
and, potentially, cancer propagation [7].  The scope and long history of game theory, Prisoner’s 
Dilemma, and applications makes it surprising that a novel analytic technique for infinitely iterated 
Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD) was discovered by Press and Dyson in 2012 [8]. At its core, this method 
of analysis provides tools for understanding the mapping of the 8-dimensional hypercube of 
strategy profiles of IPD onto the 2-dimensional space of payoffs for the 2 players.  This discovery 
led to a resurgence of interest and new applications of the Prisoner’s Dilemma, mostly in 
evolutionary dynamics [9,10,11,12].  The zero-determinant strategy (ZDS) assumes a player 
always defects after mutual defection along with other conditions on the player’s actions [8].  ZDS 
was shown to result in a linear relationship between scores of the players.  A ZDS that received a 
higher score than a fully cooperative opponent was called extortionate. 
 
We develop a general analytic technique using the concept of strategy parameter.  We identify 
strategy sets that lead to vertex scores of the PD stage game and strategy sets that map onto the 
edges of the stage game.  These edge strategy sets correspond to players who fully defect or fully 
cooperate independent of the strategy set of the other player.  We show, using a strategy parameter 
analysis, that linear relations between player scores are a ubiquitous feature of the infinitely 
iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma for many well-known strategy sets. Strategy sets include tit-for-tat 
(TFT), win-stay-lose-shift (WSLS), randomized versions of TFT and WSLS, and a randomized 
strategy set called the -strategy set which is an extended version of Axelrod’s RANDOM strategy 
set [3,5,6,9,11].  TFT and WSLS also play vs an opponent using an arbitrary strategy.  The initial 
Axelrod tournaments for IPD were won by TFT [3].  Nowak now calls WSLS “currently ‘world 
champion’” of play for the IPD [6].  The linear relations generated using our strategy parameter 
analysis give theoretical underpinnings for these computer tournament results. 
 
Based on strategy parameter analysis, we define a general strategy set (DaMD, “Defection after 
Mutual Defection”) that subsumes the ZDS and that can generate a score for its user that is larger 
than or equal to the score of the other player.     We call these two classes of DaMD – extortive 
and reciprocal.  This score ordering is independent of the opponent strategy unless the opponent 
also uses DaMD.  We show that other strategies besides DaMD and ZDS can also result in the 
same type of behavior of scores, but with an important difference.  WSLS is a particularly 
surprising strategy set in that it has extortive and reciprocal score ordering, but the outcomes are 
decided by the play of the opponent.  Mutual DaMD strategies, leading to a string of mutual 
defection, are the equilibrium strategy profile for two rational players in an infinitely iterated 
Prisoner’s Dilemma game.  This is the same result as the equilibrium mutual defection strategy 
profile for the single-play and finitely iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma games.  The DaMD, however, 
describes a possible pathway to cooperation and enhanced scores for both players, including 
rational and naïve players.  The result can be stable scores greater than those of mutual defection 
for both players. 
 
 
 
3 
 
 
II. Prisoner’s Dilemma Stage Game 
 
The focus here is the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD) game.  The IPD is based on the static, 
stage game that is described in terms of a 2X2 matrix with ordered pair elements.  This matrix 
captures both the strategies and the payoffs of the players in the stage game [13,14].  Fig. 1 gives 
a standard form of the matrix. 
 
  
Figure 1. Prisoner’s Dilemma Matrix. 
                                                                   See text for discussion.                                                
 
In Fig. 1, the two players are labeled X and Y. Decisions or actions for the individual players are 
labeled by c (cooperate) and d (defect).  The ordered pairs in the four quadrants enclosed by 
brackets are payoffs of the two players. The first entry of the ordered pair corresponds to the payoff 
for player X, the second entry to the payoff for player Y.  The analysis here is not restricted to 
having the payoffs for X and Y the same, but we shall assume this condition resulting in a 
symmetric stage game.  So 'R R= , etc.  If both players cooperate, the payoff is R (reward) to each.  
If both player defect, the payoff is P (punishment) to each.  If one player cooperates and the other 
player defects, then the player that cooperates gets payoff S (sucker) and the player that defects get 
payoff T (temptation).  The classic PD stage game puts two conditions on the four payoffs:  
T R P S    and, less crucial to PD, 2R T S + .  The first condition ensures that mutual 
defection with payoff ( ),P P  is a Nash equilibrium strategy [13,14,15].  The second condition 
ensures that mutual cooperation with payoff ( ),R R  is the best mutual outcome of the four ordered 
pairs, a Pareto optimal payoff for both players [13,14].  There are no other conditions on the 
payoffs for the PD except that usually the probabilities and payoffs employed are drawn from 
rational numbers.  Axelrod emphasizes the payoff set ( ) ( ), , , 5,3,1,0T R P S =  which satisfies the 
condition  2𝑅 > 𝑇 + 𝑆 [3].  The general analysis below does not depend on the specific values of 
the payoff set.  In all numerical examples, we use the traditional Axelrod payoffs although general 
results are valid for any payoff set that satisfies the two conditions above.  The matrix in Fig. 1 
includes both player payoffs (ordered pairs) and player actions (c or d).  Game theory uses terms 
with social, behavioral, or economic connotations so such terms (game, player, payoff, strategy, 
cooperate, defect, decision, etc.)  are encountered in various sections but are concentrated in 
Section IX. Conclusions. 
 
The payoff sets for the static stage game are frequently depicted on a 2-dimensional plane in which 
the payoffs of the two players are denoted by , , ,  or iS T R P S=  with ,i X Y= .   Fig. 2 depicts the 
payoff sets using the Axelrod values. 
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Figure 2.  Prisoner’s Dilemma stage game. 
(T,R,P,S) = (5,3,1,0).  See text for discussion. 
 
For a static stage game with single play and synchronous actions for X and Y, only the four vertices 
shown as solid circular points in Fig. 2 are valid payoffs.  However, it has been realized even from 
the original work of von Neumann and Nash, that some form of repeated game was necessary for 
game theory to be relevant to real conflicts.  This realization in turn leads to the payoff sets within 
the quadrilateral enclosed by the dashed lines including the boundary as being valid payoffs for 
the IPD.  The characterization of the strategy profiles for both players leading to these more general 
payoff points (SX,SY) is addressed below.  In preparation for this analysis, the equations for the 
straight lines forming the four edges of the quadrilateral in Fig. 2 are listed in Eq. 1 together with 
the equations for Axelrod values. 
 
i) Edge I: ( ) ( ) ( )X Y 0R S S T R S T SR− + − − =− ; X Y3 2 15 0S S+ − = . 
ii) Edge II: ( ) ( ) ( )X Y 0P S S T P S P T S− + − − − = ;  X Y4 5 0S S+ − = .             (1) 
iii) Edge III: ( ) ( ) ( )X Y 0T P S P S S P T S− + − − − = ;  X Y4 5 0S S+ − = . 
iv) Edge IV: ( ) ( ) ( )X Y 0T R S R S S T SR− + − − =− ; X Y2 3 15 0S S+ − = . 
 
At this point, the linear relations in Eq. 1 are only algebraic formulas for the dashed lines joining 
the four vertices in Fig. 2.  Below we show that the four edges have meaning for the IPD in terms 
of mapping of specific strategy profiles. 
 
III. Generalized Analysis of Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma 
 
The iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma involves infinitely repeated play of the PD stage game and 
synchronous actions of players X and Y.  The assumptions of the IPD result in transition 
probability matrices for player actions that are Markov with row entries adding to unity.   The 
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theory of infinite Markov chains is the fundamental theory for IPD [16,17].  We review the 
essential concepts of the Markov chain approach with memory-one strategies to the iterated 
Prisoner’s Dilemma [8].  The 4-vector ( )1 2 3 4, , ,p p p p=p  is the strategy set of player X. ip  are 
conditional transition probabilities for player X to cooperate in the current round of the stage game, 
and 0 1ip  .  The 4-vector ( )1 3 2 4, , ,q q p p=q  is the strategy set of Y.  iq  are also conditional 
transition probabilities for Y to cooperate so 0 1iq  .  The probabilities are: 
( )1 Prob X |p c cc= → ; ( )2 Prob X |p c cd= → ; ( )3 Prob X |p c dc= → ; ( )4 Prob X |p c dd= →  
The probabilities for Y are defined similarly except that ( )2 Prob Y |q c dc= →  and 
( )3 Prob Y |q c cd= → .  Formally, all probabilities, payoffs and scores are rational numbers. 
Payoffs can be cardinal or ordinal.   The IPD strategy profile  ;p q  forms a unit hypercube in the 
8-dimensional strategy space.  The Markov transition matrix M is defined, for example, in Nowak 
(p. 83) [6].  Mhas a unit eigenvalue.  The matrix  −M M I  is singular with zero determinant 
and stationary row eigenvector v  so =vM 0 .   The scaler product of an arbitrary vector f , given 
by the transpose ( )T 1 2 3 4, , ,f f f f=f ,  and the stationary probability vector v  is given by 
( ), ,D =v p q ff  where   is a constant.  The average of f for the Markov chain states is then 
given by 
 
( )
( )
( )
( )
, , , ,
, , , ,
D D
D D


= =

=

p q f p q fv
v p q 1 p q 1
f
f
1
,                                                                           (2) 
 
where ( )T 1,1,1,1=1 and v 1  is needed for normalization.  The determinant ( ), ,D p q f  is 
 
( )
1 1 1 1 1
2 3 2 3 2
3 2 3 2 3
4 4 4 4 4
1 1 1
1
, , det
1
p q p q f
p q p q f
D
p q p q f
p q p q f
− + − + − +
− +
=
− +
p q f ,                                                         (3) 
 
( ), ,D p q f  is obtained from the matrix M  with the vector 𝐟 using a standard set of matrix and 
determinant properties and manipulations as described eloquently by Press and Dyson [8].  
Inspection of the determinant ( ), ,D p q f  shows that the second column depends on only the 
strategy p  of player X while the third column depends on only the strategy q  of player Y.  The 
determinant ( ), ,D p q f  has a simplified, more intuitive structure compared to the Markov matrices 
𝚳 or M .  The payoff vector for X in the stage game is ( )X , , ,R S T P=S  and that for Y, 
( )Y , , ,R T S P=S .  The average payoffs (referred to as scores below) are 
 
         
( )
( )
k k
k k
, ,
, ,
S
D
D
 = =


p q Sv S
S
v p q 11
                                                                            (4) 
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where ,k X Y= .  Since v  is a stationary, probability vector of the Markov chain, 
( ), , 0D  =v p q1 1  for all p and q .  Choosing = =p q 1  gives ( ), , 1D = −1 1 1 .  This means  
0   so that ( ), , 0D p q 1  for all strategy profiles  ;p q .  The scores in Eq. 4 can be positive 
or negative depending on the payoff vectors kS  so ( )k, ,D p q S  can be positive or negative.  In 
the case of Axelrod values for the payoff vectors, all scores 
k
S  are positive so ( )k, , 0D p q S . 
 
The transition probability matrix ( ),→M M p q  and the accompanying Markov chain correspond 
to single players X and Y.  Each element of a row of M  is linear in one strategy set component, 
ip and iq .  Assume there is a population of N players each for X and for Y playing the 2X2 game 
with its own matrix ( )m n,M p q  with different X denoted by index m and Y denoted by index n.  
Then the average matrix for the population satisfies ( ) ( )m n m,n, ,=M p q M p q  because of the 
linearity just noted.  Below we let →p p  as well as →q q  and make no distinction between 
only two players X and Y or the averages over populations of players except where noted. 
 
IV.  Strategy Profiles Mapping onto Each Vertex of Stage Game 
 
The vertices of the 2-dimensional representation of the stage game in Fig. 2 are also scores for the 
IPD.  Four sets of strategies, labeled ( )xy  in the stage game, map onto each of the four vertices, 
labeled ( )X Y,S S :   
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ), ;  , ;  , ;  ,cc R R cd S T dc T S dd P P→ → → → . 
 
In the IPD, the mapping is much more complex since an infinite number of strategy profiles  ;p q  
map onto each vertex.  These vertex strategies are summarized as follows: 
 
1. ( ),R R  Vertex.  If 1 1 1p q= = ,  then inspection of the first row of the determinant 
( ), ,D p q f  shows that the first three elements are 0 so ( ) ( )1 1
1 1 1
, , ,
p q
D f D
= =
= −p q f p q .  
The determinant ( )1 ,D p q  is the 3X3 determinant obtained from ( ), ,D p q f  by removing 
the first row and fourth column.  Then Eq. 4 shows that X YS S R= = .  This means that an 
infinite number of strategy profiles  ;p q with 1 1 1p q= =  and ( )1 , 0D p q  map onto the 
( ),R R  Vertex. 
2. ( ),P P  Vertex.  If 4 4 0p q= = , then the first three elements of the fourth row are 0 so that 
( ) ( )
4 4
4 40
, , ,
p q
D f D
= =
=p q f p q .  The determinant ( )4 ,D p q  is the 3X3 determinant 
obtained from ( ), ,D p q f  by removing the fourth row and column.  Eq. 4 shows that 
X YS S P= = .  An infinite number of strategy profiles  ;p q  with 4 4 0p q= =  and 
( )4 , 0D p q  map onto the ( ),P P  Vertex. 
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3. ( ),T S  Vertex.  If 3 0p =  and 2 1q = , then the first three elements of the third row are 0 so 
that ( ) ( )
3 2
3 30; 1
, , ,
p q
D f D
= =
= −p q f p q .  The determinant ( )3 ,D p q  is the 3X3 
determinant obtained from ( ), ,D p q f  by removing the third row and fourth column.  Eq. 
4 gives ( ) ( )X Y, ,S S T S= , which is infinitely degenerate with respect to the strategy 
profiles  ;p q  with 3 0p =  and 2 1q =  as well as ( )3 , 0D p q . 
4. ( ),S T  Vertex.  If 2 1p =  and 3 0q = , then the first three elements of the second row are 0 
so that ( ) ( )
2 3
2 21; 0
, , ,
p q
D f D
= =
=p q f p q .  The determinant ( )2 ,D p q  is the 3X3 
determinant obtained from ( ), ,D p q f  by removing the second row and fourth column.  
Eq. 4 give ( ) ( )X Y, ,S S T S= , which is again infinitely degenerate with respect to the 
strategy set  ;p q  with 2 1p =  and 3 0q =  as well as ( )2 , 0D p q . 
 
Table 1 summarizes these results for the infinitely degenerate vertex strategy sets. 
 
Name Strategy Sets Stage Game Vertex 
Mutual-Cooperation 
1 1 1p q= =  with 
0 , 1,  2,3,4i ip q i  = . 
( ),R R  
Mutual-Defection 
4 4 0p q= =  with 
0 , 1,  1,2,3i ip q i  = . 
( ),P P  
Temptation-Sucker 
2 30,  1p q= =  with 
0 , 1,   for other  valuesi ip q i  . 
( ),T S  
Table 1.  Prisoner’s Dilemma Stage Game Vertex Strategy Sets.  ( ),T S  and ( ),S T  
vertices are symmetric with respect to the interchange p q . 
 
V.  Strategies Profiles Mapping onto Edges of the Stage Game 
 
We consider a class of strategy profiles that map onto the four edges of the quadrilateral defined 
by Fig. 1 and shown as dashed lines in Fig. 2.  These are called edge strategy sets.  The determinant 
in Eq. 3 depends linearly on components of the arbitrary vector f  and, hence, on the payoff vectors 
XS  and YS  when calculating scores using Eq. 4.  In addition, two columns depend on the strategy 
set of just one player, X or Y.  These key insights implied that it was possible to select  ;p q  so 
that the 8-dimensional strategy profile mapped onto a line in the 2-dimensional payoff space or, in 
other words, established a linear correlation between scores.  In this section, we introduce the 
concept of strategy parameter and parameter elimination to show that the strategy sets called 
ALLC, meaning the player always cooperates, and ALLD, meaning the player always defects, map 
onto edges of the quadrilateral of the PD stage game.  These two strategy sets are of interest in 
applications of IPD [5,6,9,11,19]. 
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A. Edge I Strategy Profiles   
 
Along Edge I, the score of X is always greater than that of Y except at the point (R,R).  Y selects 
a fully cooperative strategy set ALLC, ( )ALLC 1,1,1,1→ =q q .   The determinant in Eq. 3 becomes 
 
( )
1 1 1
2 2 2
3 3 3
4
ALLC
4 4
1 1 0
1 1
, , det
0
1
p p f
p p f
D
p p f
p p f
− + − +
− +
=p q f .                                     (5) 
 
The general expressions for the scores based on Eq. 4 and 5 are ( ) ( )X 1S R T = + +  and 
( ) ( )Y 1S R S = + +  where ( )1 31 p p = − with limits, 0    .  These expressions for the 
scores are two parametric equations in terms of the strategy parameter   which is dependent on 
the strategy set chosen by X.  Eliminating the strategy parameter gives a linear relation between 
the scores, ( ) ( ) ( )X Y 0R S S T R S T SR− + − − =− , corresponding to Edge I in Eq. 1.  The strategy 
profile  ALLC;p q  then maps onto Edge I, including the vertices.  There are no a priori assumptions 
regarding the strategy set of X, except that it is a valid conditional transition probability vector.  
The choice of ALLC by Y is sufficient for scores to fall on Edge I.  Here the ratio ( )1 31 p p = −  
is considered as a parameter that allows the scores to span their full range as   varies over its 
range 0 to  .  The mapping of the strategy profile  ALLC;p q  onto Edge I follows immediately. 
 
B. Edge II Strategy Profiles 
 
Along Edge II, the score for X is again always greater than that for Y except at the point (P,P).   If 
X plays the fully noncooperative strategy set, ALLD, where ( )ALLD 0,0,0,0→ =p p , the 
parametric equations for the scores using Eq. 4 and ALLD for X become ( ) ( )X 1S T P = + +  
and ( ) ( )Y 1S S P = + +  with strategy parameter ( )2 41 q q = −  and 0    .   Eliminating 
  gives the linear relation, ( ) ( ) ( )X Y 0P S S T P S P T S− + − − − =  corresponding to Edge II.   
Along Edge II, X YS S  for all strategy profiles with ALLD for X except those giving (P,P) which 
occurs when Y defects after mutual defection, 4 0q = .   Alternative paths to Edge II occur when 
X choses the strategy sets ( )1,0,0,0=p  and ( )0,1,0,0=p  with 2 40 , 1q q  .  The scores are the 
same as Eq. 1 corresponding to Edge II.   
 
C. Edge IV Strategy Profiles 
 
Along Edge IV, the score of Y is always greater than that of player X except at the point (R,R).  
The strategic situation for Y along Edge IV is symmetric to that of X along Edge I.  Assume X 
selects a fully cooperative strategy set ALLC, ( )ALLC 1,1,1,1→ =p p .  Following the analysis for 
Edge I strategy profiles, the scores are ( ) ( )X 1S R S = + +  and ( ) ( )Y 1S R T = + +  where 
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( )1 31 q q = − with limits, 0    .  Eliminating the strategy parameter   gives a linear relation 
between the scores, ( ) ( ) ( )X Y 0T R S R S S T SR− + − − =− , corresponding to Edge IV.  The 
strategy profile  ALLC;p q  then maps onto Edge IV, including the vertices.  There are no a priori 
assumptions regarding the strategy set for Y, except that it is a valid conditional probability vector. 
 
D. Edge III Strategy Profiles 
 
Along Edge III, the score for Y is again always greater than that for X except at the point (P,P).  
The analysis parallels that for Edge II.  If Y plays the fully noncooperative strategy, ALLD, where 
( )ALLD 0,0,0,0→ =q q , then the parametric equations for the scores using Eq. 3 and 4 become 
( ) ( )X 1S S P = + +  and ( ) ( )Y 1S T P = + +  with ( )2 41 p p = −  and 0    .   
Eliminating the strategy parameter   gives the linear relation, 
( ) ( ) ( )X Y 0T P S P S S P T S− + − − − = , corresponding to Edge III.  Y XS S  for all strategy 
profiles except at (P,P).  Alternative paths to Edge III occur if Y choses the strategy sets, 
( )1,0,0,0=q  and ( )0,1,0,0 .  The resulting scores correspond to Edge III.   
 
The strategy sets ALLC and ALLD map onto edges including vertices of the PD stage game.  This 
result is general and independent of the exact strategy set of the other player.   Fig. 3 summarizes 
the conditions for play along the edges of the PD stage game. 
 
 
Figure 3.  Vertices and Edges of the PD stage 
game mapped by ALLC and ALLD vs a general 
strategy set. See text for additional discussion. 
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VI.  Mapping onto Interior of Stage Game: TFT, RTFT, WSLS, RWSLS, and −Strategy 
 
We leave the vertices and edges of the stage game and venture into the interior of the quadrilateral 
by selecting more general strategy profiles.  Table 2 summarizes the strategy sets that map onto 
the interior of the PD stage game in the present paper. 
 
Name (Acronym) Strategy Sets - Iterated 
Prisoner’s Dilemma 
DaMD strategy set Reference 
Tit-for-Tat (TFT) ( )1,0,1,0  Yes 3, 5,6,8,19 
Random Tit-for-Tat 
(RTFT) 
( )1, ,1,   with 0 1   No Present 
paper 
Generous Tit-for-Tat 
(GTFT) 
( )1,1 3,1,1 3  No 6 
Win-Stay-Lose-Shift 
(WSLS) 
( )1,0,0,1  No 5,6 
Random Win-Stay-Lose-
Shift (RWSLS) 
( )1, , ,1   with 0 1   No Present 
paper 
RANDOM ( )1 2,1 2,1 2,1 2  No 3 
−Strategy ( ), , ,     with 0 1   No Present 
paper 
Defect after Mutual 
Defection (DaMD). Sec. 
VIII. 
4 0p =  Yes Present 
paper 
Table 2.  Stage Game Interior Strategy Sets analyzed in the present paper. 
 
Tit-for-tat (TFT) and win-stay-lose shift (WSLS) are two well-known strategy sets.  TFT strategy 
involves repeating the other player’s action on the next step.  It is described by the strategy set 
( )TFT 1,0,1,0→ =p p .  A more general strategy set involves letting ( )RTFT 1, ,1, → =p p  where 
the parameter   is any rational number satisfying 0 1  .  This is called the random tit-for-tat 
(RTFT) strategy set.  WSLS involves not changing action if both players had the same action on 
the previous round and changing action if the players had different actions on previous round.  It 
is described by ( )WSLS 1,0,0,1→ =p p .  A random WSLS strategy set is defined by
( )RWSLS 1, , ,1 → =p p  and given the acronym, RWSLS. 
 
A third random strategy set called the −strategy is defined by ( )1,1,1,1 → =q q  where   is a 
rational number satisfying 0 1  .  This strategy is Axelrod’s RANDOM strategy when 1 2 =  
[3].  The −strategy provides a mechanism for nonlinear trajectories of scores in the interior of the 
stage game.  The parameter  in the −strategy means that the player cooperates with a probability 
  and defects with 1 − .  The value 1 2 =  is considered a “coin-flipping” strategy set for a 
player who posits that unpredictability can result in an enhanced score or who has no rational 
model of the IPD but must compete.  Since 
iq =  taken over an ensemble, there can be 
fluctuations in the individual iq in a stationary Markov chain.  For example, the 0.95 =  can 
correspond to the average 
iq  for a player intending to play ALLC but making errors.  
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A. TFT and RTFT vs −Strategy 
 
With the strategy profile, ( )RTFT 1, ,1, → =p p  and ( )1,1,1,1 → =q q , the determinant in Eq. 
3 becomes 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
22
RTFT 1 1 2 3 2 4, , 1 1 1 1D f f f f f f        = − − − + + − − − + −      p q f  .      (6) 
 
The scores are ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
22
X , 1 1 1 1R S P S R TS          = + − + − + − + + −        and 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
22
Y , 1 1 1 1S R T P T R S         = + − + − + − + + −        .  These scores are 
parametric equations in the two strategy parameters   and  which determine the strategy profile 
 RTFT; p q .  The scores are linear in   but nonlinear in   because each iq = .  We consider two 
cases obtained by holding one parameter constant and varying the other. 
 
1. Constant   (RTFT) and varying   (−Strategy) 
 
TFT has 0 = ,  ( )TFT 1,0,1,0=p , and ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
22
X Y0, 0, 1 + 1S S R P T S     = = + − − + .  
The scores are equal and trace out the line from ( ),P P  to ( ),R R  as   varies between 0 and 1.  
The case 1 =  gives ALLC with ( )ALLC 1,1,1,1=p .  Scores are ( ) ( )X 1, 1R SS   = + − , and 
( ) ( )Y 1, 1R TS   = + − . The strategy parameter   can be eliminated to give 
( ) ( ) ( )X Y 0T R S R S S T SR− + − − =− , corresponding to Edge IV, including the mutual Pareto 
optimum ( ),R R  of the stage game as well as ( ),S T .  The Generous Tit-for Tat (GTFT) has 
1 3 =  with scores ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
22
X 1 3, 1 2 3+ 1 2 3 3R P S T R SS     = + − + − + +  and 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
22
X 1 3, 1 2 3+ 1 3 2 3R P T T R SS     = + − + − + + .  These parametric equations in 
  for GTFT correspond to a curve with endpoints ( ),R R  for 1 =  and ( ) ( )2 3, 2 3P S P T+ +    
for 0 = .  The endpoint for 0 =  falls on Edge III.  Finally, the RANDOM strategy with 
1 2 =  gives the following scores, ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
22
X 1 2, 1 2+ 1 2 2R P S T R SS     = + − + − + + , 
and ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
22
Y 1 2, 1 2+ 1 2 2R P T T R SS     = + − + − + + .  These parametric equations in 
  correspond to a curve with endpoints ( ),R R  for 1 =  and ( ) ( )2, 2P S T P+ +    for 0 = .  
The endpoint for 0 =  again falls on Edge III.  Fig. 4 summarizes these results. 
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Figure 4. RTFT vs −Strategy.  X playing TFT ( = 0) gives 
the line from (P,P) to (R,R).  X playing GTFT (X = 1/3)  
shows curvature and is in region SX < SY. See text. 
 
The selection of the TFT strategy set ( 0 = ) by X results in equal scores for X and Y.  But if X 
selects any other value of 0  , the result is a score that falls in the region where Y XS S , 
including the GTFT strategy set.  We return to the issue of score orderings below.  Although cases 
of TFT and ALLC result in straight lines, the other cases of  , for example GTFT, are quadratic 
in   and are curvilinear in Fig. 4.  Since the IPD is symmetric in X Y , similar results follow 
for the region where X YS S .  These lines are also shown in Fig. 4.  The dashed edges are not 
traced by a single strategy profile but are the endpoints for (infinitely many) lines and curves traced 
by the strategy profiles with constant  . 
  
2. Constant  (−Strategy) and varying   (RTFT) 
 
The case 1 =  gives ALLC for Y so ( )ALLC 1,1,1,1→ =q q .   Section V.A predicts this strategy set 
for Y maps into Edge I, and for 1 =  the scores for are indeed equal, YXS S R== , the endpoint 
for Edge I.  The case 0 =  gives ALLD for Y so ( )ALLD 0,0,0,0→ =q q  and Sec. V.D predicts 
that this strategy set maps to Edge III.  The scores are ( ) ( )X , 0 1S PS    = = + − , and 
( ) ( )Y , 0 1T PS    = = + − .  The parameter   can be eliminated to give 
( ) ( ) ( )X Y 0T P S P S S T SP− + − − =− , the general relation for Edge III including ( ),P P  and 
( ),T S  of the PD stage game.  The case 1 2 = gives the strategy profile RTFT vs. RANDOM  with 
scores, ( ) ( ) ( )X , 1 2 4S T R P S T P R S  = = + + + − + − −   , and  
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( ) ( ) ( )Y , 1 2 4S T R P S T R P S  = = + + + + + − −   .  The strategy parameter   can be eliminated 
to give ( ) ( ) ( )( )X Y2 02T R P S S T P R S S T S T R P S+ − − + − − − − + + + =+ , a line with 
endpoints ( )X Y 4S S T R P S= = + + +  and ( ) ( )2, 2R S T R+ +   , which lies on Edge IV.  For 
Axelrod values, X Y14 6 45 0S S+ − = .  Fig. 5 summarizes these results for RTFT vs −Strategy. 
 
Figure 5. RTFT vs −Strategy.  X playing ALLD (X = 0)  
gives Edge II.  Y playing ALLD gives Edge III.  X or Y 
choosing = 0 gives (R,R).  See text. 
 
The lines and curves in Fig. 4 and 5 cover the vertices, edges, and interior of the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma stage game as the parameters range through the rational numbers from 0 to 1. 
 
B. TFT vs General Y Strategy 
 
With the general strategy profile  TFT;p q , the determinant in Eq. 3 becomes 
( ) ( )( ) ( )( )TFT 1 2 4 2 3 1 4 4 1 3, , 1 1 1D f q q f f q q f q q= − − + − − − −p q f .   Using Eq. 4, the scores are 
( )  X Y 1 1 3 1 1 31 2R T S PS S      = = + + + + +    where the two strategy parameters are given 
by  ( )1 1 21 q q = − , and ( )3 3 41 q q = −  with the conditions 0 i   .  The scores map onto 
the line from the endpoint ( ),P P  for 1  finite and ( )3 4 0q → =  to the endpoint ( ),R R  for 
( )1 3 1 30 1q q = = = = , as expected.  The line in Fig. 4 from ( ),P P  to ( ),R R , therefore, also 
describes TFT vs General Y Strategy. 
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C. WSLS and RWSLS vs −Strategy 
 
With these strategy profiles,  RWSLS; p q , the determinant in Eq. 3 becomes 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
22
RWSLS 1 2 4 1 2 3, , 1 1 1 1D f f f f f f       = − − − + − − − + + −      p q f .               (7) 
 
The scores are obtained from Eq. 7 as follows: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
22
XRWSLS, , 1 1 1 1D R S P R S T       = − − − + − − − + + −      p q S ,               (8) 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
22
RWSLS Y, , 1 1 1 1D R T P R T S       = − − − + − − − + + −      p q S ,              (9) 
 
( ) ( ) ( )
22
RWSLS , , 2 1 1D      = − − − − − 
p q 1 .                                                                      (10) 
 
Then, the scores from Eq. 4 are 
 
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )RWSLS RWSLS
X YRWSLS RWSLS
X Y
, , , ,
, ,       ,
, , , ,
D D
D D
S S
 
    = =
p q S p q S
p q 1 p q 1
.                                        (11) 
 
The case 0 = corresponds the WSLS playing against the −strategy.   These scores are again 
parametric equations in the two strategy parameters   and  which determine the strategy profile 
 RTFT; p q .  The scores are linear in   but nonlinear in   because each iq = . 
 
The case 0 = gives the classic WSLS strategy set  ( )WSLS 1,0,0,1=p  vs the −strategy.  Eq. 11 
gives ( ) ( ) ( )( )X 0, 1 2S R T P S  = + + − +   , and ( ) ( ) ( )( )Y 0, 1 2R S T PS   = + + − +   . 
The strategy parameter   is eliminated to give the linear relation for  WSLS; p q ,
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )X Y2 2 0T P R S S T R P S S T R T P R S P S+ − − + + − − − + + + + + = , 
with endpoints ( ) ( )2, 2R T R S+ +    and ( ) ( )2, 2P S T P+ +    lying on Edges I and III, 
respectively.  For Axelrod values, the line becomes X Y6 14 45 0S S+ − =  with endpoints  ( )1 2,3  
and ( )4,3 2 .  It is labeled X 0 = , WSLS, in Fig. 6.  This line shows that the strategy profile 
 WSLS; p q  results in scores that that are larger for X, X YS S , when 1 2  ,  and for Y, 
Y XS S , when 1 2  .  The case of equal scores ( )X Y 4S S T R P S= = + + +  occurs when 
1 2 = .  This ordering of scores is discussed further in the next section with Y playing a general 
strategy set.  The line for Y playing WSLS and X playing the −strategy is also shown.  This line 
has endpoints on Edges II and IV and passes through the point of equal scores as shown in Fig. 6. 
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Figure 6. RWSLS vs -Strategy.  X playing ALLC gives 
Edge IV.  X playing WSLS (X = 0) gives line from Edge III 
to Edge I.  Symmetric lines for Y also shown.  No scores are 
allowed in cross hatched region including (P,P). 
 
The case X 1 = , ALLC for X, maps into Edge IV as expected.  The case for X 1 2 =  gives 
( )RWSLS 1,1 2,1 2,1=p  so that scores are given by Eq. 8 to 11 as 
 
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
22
22
X
2 1 2 1 2
1,
2 1 1 2
R R T S S P
S
   

  
+ − + + + − +  =
 − + − −
 
,                                       (12) 
( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
22
22
Y
2 1 2 1 2
1,
2 1 1 2
R R T S T P
S
   

  
+ − + + + − +  =
 − + − −
 
.                                       (13) 
 
The parametric Eq. 12 and 13 are quadratic in the strategy parameter   so curvature is expected 
and clearly observed in Fig. 6 for the curvilinear line labeled X 1 2 = .  The endpoints of the 
curvilinear line are (𝑅, 𝑅) for 1 =  and, for 0 = , ( ) ( )2 3, 2 3S P T P+ +    which lies on Edge III.  
All scores for X 1 2 =  satisfy Y XS S  except for (𝑅, 𝑅).  There is X Y symmetry for playing 
RWSLS vs −strategy so comparable lines are plotted in Fig. 6.  There are no scores allowed in 
the quadrilateral bounded by the two lines for WSLS vs −strategy and Edges II, III.  For 0 = , 
scores fall on Edges II and III, but are limited by endpoints of WSLS lines from approaching 
(𝑃, 𝑃). 
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D. WSLS vs General Strategy 
 
With the strategy profile  WSLS;p q , the determinant in Eq. 3 becomes 
( ) ( ) ( )( )( ) ( )WSLS 1 2 4 2 4 1 2 3 3 1, , 1 1 1 1D f q q f f q q f q q= − − − + − − − −p q f .   Eq. 4 gives the scores 
 
( )1 2 1 2
X
1 2 1 22
T R S P
S
   
   
+ + +
=
+ +
,  
( )1 2 1 2
Y
1 2 1 22
S R T P
S
   
   
+ + +
=
+ +
.                             (14) 
 
The two strategy parameters are ( )1 1 41 q q = −  and ( )2 2 31 q q = − with the conditions 
0 i   .   The parametric equations give essentially an infinite number of linear relations 
between the scores for various conditions on the two strategy parameters, and hence, the transition 
probability vector q .  If ( )1 10 1q = = , then X YS S R= = .  If ( )2 20 1q = = , then XS T= , 
YS S= .  If ( )1 4 0q → = , then the scores are ( ) ( )X 2 21 2S T P S = + + +    and 
( ) ( )Y 2 21 2S S T P = + + +   .  The endpoints of the line are ( ) ( )2, 2P S T P+ +    on Edge III and 
( ),T S .  The strategy parameter 2  can be eliminated between the last two equations for the scores 
to get:  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )X Y2 2 0T P S S T P S S T T P S S P+ − + − − − + + + = .  Axelrod values give 
X Y2 3 10 0S S+ − = .  As a final example, let ( )2 2 31 1q q = + =  so that  
( ) ( )X Y 1 11 3S S R T P S = = + + + +   .  These equal scores form a line with endpoints  ( ),R R  
when ( )1 10 1q = =  and ( )X Y 3S S T P S= = + +  when ( )1 4 0q → = .  Plots of these general 
results give a figure like Fig. 6 with the addition of the line for equal scores from ( ),R R  to 
( )X Y 3S S T P S= = + + .  For Axelrod values, these endpoints are ( )3,3  to ( )2,2 . 
Varying the two strategy parameters generates an infinity of lines covering the area as indicated in 
Fig. 6, but lines are excluded from the cross hatched area with vertex now at ( )2,2 . 
Fig. 6 shows that WSLS vs −strategy falls along a line that satisfies three orderings X YS S , 
Y XS S , and  X YS S= .   For X choosing WSLS and Y choosing a general strategy, the relative 
magnitudes of the scores satisfy the following similar conditions: 
 
i) X YS S (altruistic):  This gives ( ) ( )1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2T R S P S R T P       + + +  + + + .  If  
( )1 1 40 1 and q 0q     so it can be eliminated in the condition, then 2 1   , and the 
inequality in the scores results from 2 3+ >1 q q . 
ii) Y XS S (extortive):  This gives ( ) ( )1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2T R S P S R T P       + + +  + + + .  
Similar analysis shows that the inequality in the scores results from 2 3+ <1 q q . 
iii) X YS S= (reciprocal):  The equality in scores clearly results from 2 3+ =1 q q . 
 
If X chooses WSLS, then the Y strategy set determines the orderings (extortive, reciprocal, and 
altruistic) of the scores.  Stated another way, Y choosing a strategy set that can be extortive, 
reciprocal, or altruistic is conditional on X choosing WSLS.  Note here that there is no condition 
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on 𝑞4, the probability to defect after mutual defection.  These results are consistent with those 
when X choses WSLS and Y choses the −strategy discussed in the previous section.  More 
comments on this surprising result are in Section IX. Conclusions. 
 
VII. DaMD Strategy Set vs -Strategy and WSLS.  Reciprocity and Extortion 
 
The DaMD strategy set is defined by 𝐩DaMD = (𝑝1, 𝑝2, 𝑝3, 𝑝4 = 0).  For the strategy profile 
{𝐩DaMD, 𝐪ℇ}, Eq. 3 gives 
 
𝐷(𝐩DaMD, 𝐪ℇ, 𝐟) = −𝑝3{[𝜀
2𝑓1 + 𝜀(1 − 𝜀)𝑓2] + [𝜀𝜌1 + (1 − 𝜀)𝜌2][𝜀𝑓3 + (1 − 𝜀)𝑓4]},     (14) 
 
with two strategy parameters are defined as ( )1 1 31 p p −= , and ( )2 2 31 p p −= .  Eq. 4 and 
14 gives the following expressions for the scores, ( ) ( )XS a b  = + +  and ( ) ( )YS c d  = + + .  
The strategy parameter   is expressed as ( )1 21    −+   so 0 +  .  The symbols, a, b, 
c, d, are given by 
 
( )
( )
( )
( )
2
2
1
1
1
1
a R S
b T P
c R T
d S P
  
 
  
 
= + −

= + − 

= + − 

= + − 
   .                                                                                                 (15) 
 
The strategy parameter   can be eliminated from the scores giving the linear relation, 
 
( ) ( ) ( )YX 0S S     + + = ,                                                                              (16) 
 
where 
( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
22
1
1
1 1
R S T P
T R P S
T S R T S P
   
   
     

= − + − − 

= − + − − 

 = − − + − + + −  
.                                                 (17) 
 
When Y plays ALLD so that 0 = , then the scores map onto ( ),P P .  If Y plays ALLC so that 
1 = , then the linear relationship between scores is ( ) ( ) ( )YX 0R S S T R S R T S− + − − − = , giving 
Edge I.  If Y plays RANDOM, 1 2 = , then the scores satisfy a linear relationship in the interior 
of the stage game, ( ) ( ) ( )( )YX2 2 0T R P S S T P R S S T S T R P S+ − − + + − − − − + + + = .  For 
Axelrod values, the line is X Y14 6 45 0S S+ − = .  The end points of this line fall on Edges II and 
IV.  There is symmetry with player Y playing DaMD and X playing an −strategy.  For this strategy 
profile, the line for  1 =  for X maps onto Edge IV; 0 = maps onto ( ),P P .  The line with 
1 2 = maps onto the interior of the stage game quadrilateral.  These lines are shown in Fig. 7.  
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As  scans between its limits, the edges and interior of the quadrilateral are covered by the lines 
generated. 
 
Figure 7.   DaMD vs -Strategy.  X plays DaMD: Y plays 
ALLC ( = 1) giving Edge I; Y plays ALLD ( = 0) giving 
(P,P).  Line from (P,P) to (R,R) described in Sec. VIII.   
Symmetric results for X  Y. 
 
Fig. 7 shows that the line generated when X plays DaMD and Y plays RANDOM falls in the 
regions where X YS S and X YS S .  The exact point on the line depends on the value of  the 
strategy parameter   through 1  and 2 , so ultimately through the probabilities ip , i = 1,2,3.  
There are two orderings of the scores other than equal scores: 
 
i) X YS S (extortive):  This condition gives 1  −  so that 
( ) ( )( )1 2 31 1 1p p p −  − −+ .  The inequality is valid for arbitrary   and 1p , with 
1,  1 ,  1 0p − −  , and 2 3 1p p + . 
ii) Y XS S (altruistic):  This condition gives 1  −  which in turn gives  
( ) ( )( )1 2 31 1 1p p p −  − −+  .  If 1,  1 ,  1 0p − −  , then 2 3 1p p + . 
 
If Y chooses to play WSLS rather than a −strategy, Eq. 3 gives for the strategy profile 
{𝐩DaMD, 𝐪WSLS} and 𝐷(𝐩DaMD, 𝐪WSLS, 𝐟) = −(1 − 𝑝1)[𝑝3𝑓2 + (1 − 𝑝2)(𝑓3 + 𝑓4)].  Then Eq. 4 
gives the scores as ( ) ( )X 1 2S S T P  + + +  =  and ( ) ( )Y 1 2S T S P  + + +  =  with the strategy 
parameter given by ( )2 31 p p = −  where 0    .  The strategy parameter can be 
eliminated to get the line, ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )X Y2 2 0T P S S T P S S T T P S S P− − + + − − + + + = .  For Axelrod 
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values, X Y3 2 10 0S S+ − =  for DaMD vs WSLS.  The endpoints of the line are the vertex ( ),S T  
and ( ) ( )2, 2T P S P+ +    on Edge II.  There are again two possibilities for the order of the 
scores: 
 
i) X YS S  (extortive): This gives 1   and 2 3 1p p + . 
ii) Y XS S (altruistic): This gives 1   and 2 3 1p p + . 
 
The terms extortive and altruistic for Y playing WSLS rather than X are used in an opposite fashion 
to the previous section because here the strategy of player X determines the orderings of scores.  
The condition 2 3 1p p +  for ensuring X YS S ,  is a general property of DaMD not limited to Y 
playing an −strategy or WSLS.  We show this in detail in the next Section. 
 
VIII. DaMD vs Arbitrary Strategy 
 
We let X play DaMD and Y play an arbitrary strategy.  Eq. 3 gives  
 
𝐷(𝐩DaMD, 𝐪, 𝐟) = −∑ 𝑓𝑖𝐷𝑖
4
𝑖=1 (𝐩DaMD, 𝐪),                                                                       (18) 
 
where   𝐷1,3(𝐩DaMD, 𝐪) = 𝑞4𝛿1,3(𝐩DaMD, 𝐪),   𝐷2(𝐩DaMD, 𝐪) = −𝑞4𝛿2(𝐩DaMD, 𝐪), and 
( ) ( )4 1 1 3 2 2 31 1D q q q  − + + −= .  The 2X2 determinants 𝛿𝑖(𝐩DaMD, 𝐪)  are 
 
2 3 2
1
3 2 3
1
det
p q p
p q p

− +
= , 
1 1 1
2
3 2 3
1 1
det
p q p
p q p

− + − +
= , 
1 1 1
3
2 3 2
1 1
det
1
p q p
p q p

− + − +
=
− +
.     (19) 
 
Eq. 4, 18, and 19 give the scores, XS  and YS .  If X YS S , then it is readily seen that 
𝐷(𝐩DaMD, 𝐪, 𝐒X) < 𝐷(𝐩DaMD, 𝐪, 𝐒Y) since 𝐷(𝐩DaMD, 𝐪, 𝟏) < 0 in general.  For the symmetric 
PD stage game, 1f R=  and 4f P= .  This means that 2 3 2 3S T T S   − −  after 4 0q   has 
been eliminated.  This means 2 3 −   if 4 0q  .  Evaluating the determinants, substituting, and 
rearranging results in the inequality ( )( ) ( )2 3 1 2 3 3 2 1 11 1 1p p p p q p q p q+ −  − + − .  This 
inequality is true for all iq  if 2 3 1p p+   and ensures that X YS S  so this is an extortive DaMD 
since player X determines the score orderings. 
 
Fig. 7 also shows the line from ( ),P P  to ( ),R R  corresponding to the case of equal scores, 
Y XS S= .  In the case of equal scores for DaMD vs -strategy, we have a b c d + = +  from Sec. 
VII.  This condition means that 1 = − .  From the definition of the strategy parameter  , the 
following condition on the ip  follows, ( ) ( )( )1 2 31 1 1p p p − = − + − .  This condition is true for 
all   if 2 3 1p p+ = , 1 1p = .  The scores now read ( )( ) ( )
22
X Y 1 1S S R T S P   = = + − + + −  
and give the line from ( ),P P  to ( ),R R  as   ranges from 0 to 1.  This result can also be 
generalized.  The condition 2 3 1p p =+  for ensuring X YS S=  is a general property of DaMD not 
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limited to Y playing an −strategy.  To see this, we use the same argument as above to show  that 
X YS S=  leads to the condition 2 3 − = , implying that 
( )( ) ( )( )1 1 2 3 1 2 3 3 21 1 1p q p p p p q p q− − − − = − + .  This condition is valid for all q  when 1 1p = , 
and 2 3 1p p+ = .  With these conditions on the ip , Eq. 4 and 18 give the line from ( ),P P  to ( ),R R  
as ( ) ( )X Y 1S S R P = = + +  where the strategy parameter is now 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 4 2 3 2 3 3 3 3 21 1 1q q q p q q p q p q      = − − + + − +       and 0     for all q  and 3p .  
X YS S R= =  when 1 1q =  and 0 = .  Also X YS S P= =  when 4 0q = and  → .   Again, the 
strategy parameter analysis allows a more transparent analysis of the linear relation between 
scores.  The strategy parameter is a function of the strategy profile ( ), = p q  so as the strategy 
profile  ;p q  varies, the strategy parameter   scans through its limits 0     and traces 
through the linear relation for the scores.  Table 3 summarizes the results for DaMD vs an arbitrary 
strategy set. 
 
DaMD Strategy for player X Score Ordering Conditions on probabilities 
   Generic strategy Not specified 4 0p =  
   Extortive strategy X YS S  4 0p = , 2 3 1p p+   
   Reciprocal strategy X YS S=  1 1p = , 4 0p = , 2 3 1p p+ =  
Table 3.  DaMD strategies with generic, extortive, and reciprocal conditions. 
 
IX. Conclusions 
 
The general analysis presented here establishes many specific features of the mapping from the 8-
dimensioal hypercube defined by the strategy profile  ;p q  onto the 2-dimensional space of scores 
( )X Y,S S .  The concept of strategy parameter is key to this technique to identify the lines that are 
mapped by a strategy profile.  Vertex strategy profiles are shown in Fig. 2 and Table 1.  Edge 
strategy profiles are described in Fig. 3 and Sec. V.  These ALLC and ALLD are the key edge 
strategy sets with ALLC mapping onto Edges I and IV and ALLD mapping onto Edges II and III 
for any opponent strategy sets.  In the specific example of Ref. 8, the extortionate strategy set 
(ZDS) is played against an ALLC strategy so maps onto Edge I.  This is readily seen by taking Eq. 
16 in Ref. 8 and eliminating the parameter  resulting in the expression for Edge I.  Press and 
Dyson also showed how a player Y, whom they call “evolutionary” and who only acts to increase 
Y’s own score without regard for the score of X, can be extorted if X plays the ZDS.  We refer to 
the “evolutionary” player who only considers that player’s own score as a “naïve” player.  We 
return to this feature for DaMD below. 
 
Several famous strategy profiles are shown to map onto lines in the interior of the PD stage game.  
The -strategy is played against tit-for-tat (TFT) and win-stay-lose-shift (WSLS) as well as random 
versions of these two strategies (RTFT and RWSLS) as models.  TFT and WSLS are also played 
against a general strategy set for Y.  The scores for these games are expressed in terms of one or 
more strategy parameters which depend on a specific combination of the transition probabilities, 
p  or q , appropriate to the strategy profiles.  The strategy parameter(s) is then eliminated between 
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the scores for both players resulting in a linear relation between the scores.  This is done for 
mapping of the 8-dimensional hypercube of strategy profiles into the 2-dimensional space of scores 
including edges and the interior of the stage game.  The specific expressions for scores give the 
endpoints of the line.  Linear relations between scores are ubiquitous and are not specific to ZDS 
or DaMD.  The scores for one player acting on the −strategy are quadratic in   so the trajectories 
of the scores obtained by varying the strategy parameter   show curvature as in Figs. 4 and 6.  The 
lines and curves give insight into the behavior of the scores as the strategy profiles are 
systematically varied.  Recently human-machine experiments have verified predictions of the 
linear relations between scores [18,20].  Our analysis gives many new predictions that can guide 
experiment and decision making. 
 
It is important to be clear on the concept of a strategy set that can extort the other player.  The first 
specific example with an extortive score condition in the present work came when X chose WSLS 
while Y chose an −strategy or a general strategy.  The line for these strategy profiles passed 
through the interior of the stage game from the region where X YS S  because 2 3+ >1 q q (or 
1 2  ), to X YS S=  because 2 3+ =1 q q  ( 1 2 = ), and finally to the region where X YS S  
because 2 3+ <1 q q ( 1 2  ).  But X YS S  cannot be considered altruistic from a rational player 
X point of view because it is the selection of Y strategy set 2 3+ >1 q q which results in this score 
ordering.  It can be considered altruistic from the point of view of Y because X scores higher due 
to the strategy set chosen by Y.  Similarly, X YS S  cannot be considered extortive from the point 
of view of the rational X because it is the selection of the Y strategy set 2 3+ <1 q q which results in 
this score ordering.  This ordering is extortive for Y.  The strategic environment is subtle because 
these score orderings depend on X choosing WSLS.  But the WSLS strategy set has a good 
performance in tournaments [6].  Since the scores X YS S  when X chooses WSLS means that the 
player Y strategy set with 2 3+ >1 q q is responsible for good performance of WSLS, one possibility 
is that player X has prior information that opponents in a tournament are more likely to choose an 
altruistic strategy set with 2 3+ >1 q q  than to choose the extortive strategy set with 2 3+ <1 q q
[13,22].  Another possibility is that the tournament conditions do not satisfy the conditions for 
Markov chain analysis. For example, fluctuations may play an important role in the limited 
repetitions of a human tournament.  Fluctuations are beyond the scope of the analysis of the present 
work.  Also Fig. 6 shows a region of no scores around (P,P) when WSLS is played.   As a final 
remark, it is important to note that extortive scores for Y over X can exist when player X choses 
WSLS even without the condition of defection after mutual defection for Y ( 4 0q = ). 
 
The DaMD strategy has player (X) defecting after previous mutual defection ( 4 0p = ).  However, 
this property alone is not enough to ensure that X can extort the other player Y [23].  As we show 
above, the transition probabilities 2p  and 3p  are also crucial – extortion and reciprocity using 
the DaMD strategy rest on a three-legged stool with the three legs being the conditional transition 
probabilities 2p , 3p , and 4p .  One leg of course is 4 0p = .  The other legs determine whether 
the scores are extortive ( 2 3 1p p+   so X YS S ) or reciprocal ( 2 3 1p p+ =  so X YS S= ).  These 
results depend on only the DaMD strategy of player X unless player Y also choses a DaMD. 
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It has been long understood that the Nash equilibrium strategy of a rational player is to defect in a 
single-play, stage game of Prisoner’s Dilemma [13].  A relatively straight-forward argument 
building on that for the single-play stage game concludes that the equilibrium strategy of a rational 
player is to defect, certainly on the last play, of a finitely repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma game [22].  
It has not been clear if such an equilibrium strategy for a rational player exits in the infinitely 
repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma game.  The existence of the DaMD strategy provides an answer for 
the infinitely iterated PD:  Two rational players in infinitely repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma must 
conclude that the other rational player choses an extortive DaMD so each player decides to play 
DaMD with 2 3 1p p+   resulting in stationary scores of ( ),P P , equivalent to the result of mutual 
defection in the single-play stage game. 
 
It has also long been known that cooperation is a hallmark of human and even some animal 
behaviors [3,4,6,9,10,11,12].  Given the conclusion above that rational players must essentially 
play extortive DaMD in the IPD and take the ( ),P P  payoff, the question of how cooperation arises 
needs to be considered.  This has been considered in the papers on ZDS in evolutionary dynamics 
already referenced [9,10,11,12,18,20].  Our answer arises within DaMD itself and can lead even 
rational players out of the ( ),P P  state.  We consider two rational players.  Both players know 
that playing DaMD is a strategy set that can extort a naïve player, but also leads to low mutual 
scores ( ),P P  for two rational players.  Instead these rational players can choose to initiate the 
Markov chain using the reciprocal DaMD with 1 1p = , and 2 3 1p p+ =  for player X and the 
symmetric probability choices for player Y leading to the mutual Pareto optimal scores ( ),R R .  
These are the best mutual scores for two rational players in the IPD.  If this state is reached then, 
the two rational players can “go to lunch” and let a random number generator continue play, subject 
to the conditions of the reciprocal DaMD. 
 
The other situation is that of a rational player vs a naïve player.  The rational payer X can extort 
the naïve player Y by playing an DaMD.  But X can be concerned that extortive scores are not 
stable if Y learns and becomes a rational player and detects that X has a larger score.  Y will play 
the extortive DaMD and, when the Markov stationary state is reestablished, the scores are now 
( ),P P .  However, X can choose to play a reciprocal DaMD that results in equal scores and so 
signal to Y.  This is not necessarily altruism on the part of X, but perhaps foresight – Y eventually 
learns and becomes rational rather than remaining naïve. If the initially naïve Y is playing an -
strategy, for example, and learns to be rational, then Y can adjust  as in Fig.  and follows 
increasing scores to ( ),R R .  Such a path to cooperation has been suggested as a model for 
international affairs [21].  TFT is a classic DaMD strategy set with reciprocal probabilities since 
2 3 1p p+ =  and X YS S= .  From the point of view of the present work, it is no accident that TFT 
performed so well in the initial two tournaments of Axelrod – TFT takes the road to cooperation 
and hence to the ( ),R R  state.  The concepts of altruism [3,4,6], reciprocity [3,4,6], stability 
[3,6,22], signaling [13,22], and learning [6,22] have deep meaning in game theory.  We use the 
dictionary definitions of these concepts to give a viable description of a path to cooperation that 
uses reciprocal DaMD as defined herein. 
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A naïve player always has a score lower than a rational player playing an extortive DaMD unless 
the naïve player choses an DaMD, perhaps by chance.  As a final example, let X select the extortive 
DaMD given by ( )3 4,1 4,1 4,0=p , and Y select an -strategy given by ( ), , ,   =q .  Using 
the results in Section VII and choosing Axelrod values, the scores are given by 
( ) ( )2X 3 10 5 3S   = + − −  and ( )Y 3 3S = −  with extortive ordering X YS S  if 0 < 𝜀 < 1 2⁄ .  
The equal scores ( )1,1  occur when 0 = . To quantify the asymmetry in the extortive scores, we 
define a distance measure ( )d  between scores by ( ) ( ) ( )X Y 5 2 3 0d S S   = − = − −  .  Such 
a distance measure is related to the concept of frustration that is useful in landscape theory of 
complexity [19,24,25] and to potential games [22].  In Fig. 8, we plot the scores and the distance 
measure for rational and naïve players starting at ( )1,1  so 0 = . The rational player plays the 
extortive DaMD above and the naïve player Y randomly increases   over 1000 Markov steps to 
increase Y’s own score.  Our discussion above suggests that such a relatively large distance of 2.5 
and  
 
Figure 8.  Scores and distance metric vs Markov steps. 
Rational extortive DaMD (X) vs Naïve -Strategy (Y).  See text. 
 
resulting frustration for scores at Markov step 1000 is not be stable if the naïve player learns, 
becomes rational, and plays an extortive DaMD.  We described above a reciprocal strategy profile  
DaMD that leads to cooperation and the state ( ),R R .  Theoretical explanation of the path to 
cooperation may ultimately be based on detailed landscape dynamics [19,24,25] and fluctuations 
[25,26,27].  The present paper provides insight for the development of such a path. 
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